
Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of Defence & National Security

Glimpses from Study Visit to UK

*Based on a Study Visit to UK
Organized for Pakistani Parliamentarians
December 02-05, 2014*

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PILDAT is an independent, non-partisan and not-for-profit indigenous research and training institution with the mission to strengthen democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan.

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Abbreviations & Acronyms

ATL	Anti Terror Legislation
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CPA UK	Commonwealth Parliamentary Association – UK Branch
DAN	Defence Advice Notice
DES	Defence Equipment & Support
DIO	Defence Infrastructure Organization
EO	Exclusion Order
EP	Equipment plan
FCO	Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK
FLC	Front Line Commands
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters, UK
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IR	Independent Reviewer
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISC	Intelligence and Security Committee, UK
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MI5	United Kingdom's domestic counter-intelligence and security agency
MI6	United Kingdom's Secret Intelligence Service supplying the British Government with Foreign Intelligence
MNA	Member of the National Assembly
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MP	Member of Parliament
MPR	Major Projects Report
NAO	National Audit Office
NATO	North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSS	National Security Strategy
OSA	Officials Secrets Act
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
RA	Resource Accounts
SC	Select Committee
SoA	Statement of Acquisitions
TPIMS	Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, UK
VFM	Value For Money
ZDV	Zero Day Vulnerabilities

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Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of Defence & National Security – Glimpses from the Study Visit to United Kingdom

December 02-05, 2014

Preface

From December 02-05, 2014, PILDAT, in partnership with the CPA UK, organised a Study Visit of a multi-party delegation of five senior Members from the Parliament of Pakistan. The Study Visit focussed on the internal structures and ethos of UK political parties and how they develop their positions on national security issues in the UK. The programme was designed to give the delegation a deeper understanding of the UK national security framework, including the role of political parties in formulating the UK national security strategy along with the parliamentary oversight of defence related spending and intelligence activities. The programme also addressed the issue of the changing face of national and international security.

The delegation comprised **Senator Muhammad Mohsin Khan Leghari**, (Independent, Punjab), Member Senate Standing Committee on Defence; **Mr. Omar Ayub Khan**, MNA, (NA-19, Haripur, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, PML-N), Chairman National Assembly Standing Committee on Finance, Revenue, Economic Affairs, Statistics and Privatization; **Senator Nawabzada Saifullah Magsi**, (PPPP, Balochistan); **Mr. Sufyan Yusuf**, MNA, (NA-247, Karachi-IX, Sindh, MQM), Chairman, National Assembly Standing Committee on Communication and **Syeda Zahra Wadood Fatemi**, MNA, (NA-296-Women, Punjab, XXIV, PML-N).

As a mechanism to imbibe learning from the Study Visit, each delegate agreed to pen-down an overview of the Study Visit.

This report has been principally authored by **Mr. Omar Ayub Khan**, MNA, currently serving as the Chairman National Assembly Standing Committee on Finance and previously Minister of State for Finance. The report also carries glimpses and analyses by **Syeda Zahra Wadood Fatimi**, MNA and **Senator Mohsin Leghari**. The report provides incisive details gleaned from interactions at the Study Visit and is arguably the most comprehensive account of the Study Visit.

Acknowledgements

PILDAT is grateful to **Mr. Omar Ayub Khan**, MNA, for his participation in the Study Visit and for documentation of the details and lessons learnt during the Visit. We are also grateful to **Syeda Zahra Wadood Fatimi**, MNA and **Senator Mohsin Leghari** for sharing their analyses and input. It is a pleasure and an honour for PILDAT to be publishing this report under the PILDAT banner.

We also gratefully acknowledge the most dedicated, organised, thorough and professional support and facilitation provided by the team at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association – UK Branch (CPA-UK) under the very able leadership of **Mr. Andrew Tuggey**, DL. Special thanks are due to **Ms. Mariam El-Azm**, Asia-Pacific Programme Manager, International Outreach Team, CPA-UK for coordinating the Study Visit Programme alongside her very dedicated colleagues.

PILDAT also gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK through the British High Commission, Islamabad in funding the Study Visit through the programme “Dialogue on Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan” being implemented by PILDAT.

Disclaimer

Every effort has been made to correctly reflect the information and views contained in this report and any omission or error, therefore, is not deliberate. The views and information contained in the report does not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the FCO, UK and the British High Commission, Islamabad.

Islamabad
January 2015

December 02-05, 2014

Introduction

Parliamentarians from Pakistan were part of a delegation that visited the Houses of Parliament of the United Kingdom to gain insight into how the Parliament, Government Institutions, political parties and external organizations contribute to the formulation of the UK's national security strategy and the accountability of defence spending and intelligence activities.

Overview Of Security and Intelligence Framework in the United Kingdom

An Overview of Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence, Defence and Security Matters in the UK

We were given an introduction to the workings of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association by **Rt. Hon. Sir Alan Haselhurst** MP and **Mr. Andrew Tuggey** DL, Chief Executive & Secretary CPA UK.

The delegation was briefed about the dilemma the Parliament faced of 'Openness versus Security' and the debate revolving around fencing off Parliament Square to the General Public. The concern was that the 'Security Paradigm' should not result in the 'isolation' of Parliamentarians from the very people who elect them. The aim is to protect Parliament, Parliamentarians but any act of terror may tip the balance towards an enhanced security.

Rt. Hon. Baroness Taylor of Bolton, Former Intelligence and Security Committee Chair, gave an overview of parliamentary oversight of intelligence, defence and security matters in the UK.

She informed us about the background of how the

The challenge was to make the intelligence agencies trust the people they were to be made accountable to. The Parliamentarians realized that this would be an evolutionary process. Trust had to be earned. There was never a leak even though very important information was shared



L-R: Senator Mohsin Leghari, Senator Saifullah Magsi and Mr. Omar Ayub Khan, MNA

oversight function of the Parliament over the intelligence agencies evolved over time.

Cabinet Ministers and the Parliament felt that they were not in control of the intelligence agencies. The 1994 Intelligence Control Act was passed to facilitate the oversight function by the Parliament. MI5, MI6, GCHQ, and SIS were brought under the purview of the Intelligence Committee. 9 members were appointed by the party leaders and usually senior back benchers were nominated. The Committee met in private.

In the initial stages, the intelligence agencies found it difficult to share information. The intelligence agencies functionaries were wary of potential 'leaks' if important and sensitive intelligence was shared with the intelligence committee members.

The 1990s was a time when the 'Cold War' had 'wound down', and the Parliaments of the Western world were convinced that intelligence agencies did not require large budgetary outlays and that their budgets should be slashed. The intelligence agencies felt under threat from the looming budgetary cuts and were receptive to be made accountable to the Parliament because they felt that if the parliamentarians understood the 'nature' of their work, they could be convinced not to make drastic cuts in the intelligence agencies budgets.

The challenge was to make the intelligence agencies trust the people they were to be made accountable to. The Parliamentarians realized that this would be an evolutionary process. Trust had to be earned. There was never a leak even though very important information was shared.

An 'Annual Report' had to be published and made public with the option of 'redaction' that was carried out after 'consulting' the intelligence agencies. Members of the intelligence committee had to sign the 'Officials Secrets Act' to ensure punitive measure could be taken against them if they divulged sensitive information.

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The Committee used to meet during the time when important global events were unfolding – 9/11, Afghanistan, Bali Bombings, incidents of renditions. The members of the Committee held varying views and 'ideologies', ranging from Libertarians, Conservatives, and some were Human Rights lawyers

Initially the Intelligence Committee could not go into the 'operational details', but that has now changed and they can go into the 'operational details'. Over time the confidence between the Parliamentarians and the intelligence agencies increased and a new law 'Justice and Security Act' was passed that superseded the previous law.

This law has made the 'defacto' situation clear – sharing of operations details. The Intelligence Committee can send recommendations or reports directly to the Prime Minister. The Committee meets once a week to take evidence. No press coverage is allowed.

It requires a lot of work on the part of the parliamentarians because the work they do does not get reflected in the press and the constituents do not necessarily understand the sensitivity of the work that keeps their respective MP away from them. More than one MP has opted to resign from the Intelligence Committee due to the nature of its work and the secrecy involved.

The committee used to meet during the time when important global events were unfolding – 9/11, Afghanistan, Bali Bombings, incidents of renditions. The members of the committee held varying views and 'ideologies', ranging from Libertarians, Conservatives, and some were Human Rights lawyers. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Report (WMD Report) was unanimous and this was because of the full range of information provided to the members of the intelligence committee. The dissention during the meetings was not along party lines.

The issue of 'Rendition' was very difficult because a balance had to be struck between the courts and the intelligence agencies. In addition to this there is a

change in the level of acceptability. What was 'acceptable' 10 years ago is no longer 'acceptable'.

Torture is another issue that has seen a change in viewpoint. 10 years ago if information had been extracted under torture, it would not have been 'frowned upon' but now that viewpoint has changed.

In 2001 the National Security Strategy (NSS) was not in place and by 2008-2009 there was a push for a NSS. Prime Minister Gordon Brown established a Committee of both houses to create a NSS. Members were taken from both houses. From the House of Lords, members who had an interest became members and from the House of Commons, the chairs of the relevant committees were made members. The focus of the NSS was to strike a balance between the various types of threats ranging from Cyber to Terror etc. The Human Rights Committee was involved to look into the pitfalls of the proposed law.

The NSS grappled with the inherent contradiction of what people wanted and what they expected. The challenge was to 'educate' people. The NSS committee is still comparatively new and it has not elicited the requisite response from the Cabinet ministers. Ministers are not responding to the NSS Committee even though it has been functioning since 2010. When Prime Minister Cameron's government was formed, it was told that it did not have resources. At the moment it appears that there is lack of 'ownership' of the NSS Committee and it has been formed in haste without going into the details as to what the NSS should actually be and what resources are required.

Mr. Tobias Ellwood MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office gave an overview of the National Security Strategy of UK and its elements. The UK's NSS defines the relationship of UK with the Rest of the World 'ROW'.

In the vision of the NSS, Afghanistan, ISIS and Home Grown Terror are very important issues that have been addressed. NSS is determined by the Government but it is the Parliament's responsibility to monitor its effectiveness.

In his view, Britain has not been very firm in stating what it entails to be 'British'. To be 'British' has to be enforced. Sharia law is not acceptable in Britain and emphasis should be on integration. 'Ghettoization' should be discouraged. Communities should not congregate together to form 'Ghettos'.

The NSS has to be updated to reflect the new realities. Cyber terrorism is a new threat that is taking on

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immense importance and has to be considered as one of the threats that poses the maximum threat. Cyber terrorism has to be balanced with the libertarian view of the UK. Social media companies should take the responsibility to monitor accounts of individuals who espouse hate and terror.

The Parliament's role in formulating 'Cyber Law' is crucial. There are two schools of thoughts pertaining to Cyber Security – One school of thought advocates that each department should have its own oversight whereas the other school of thought advocates an overarching body for cyber coordination. ISIS is a rapidly rising threat and people coming back from the ISIS dominated region must be monitored. The Government is reaching out to the Imams in the communities to identify 'vulnerable' people.

Rt. Hon John Spellar MP, Shadow Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister, gave an overview of the role the Labour Party plays in the formulation and oversight of the UK's NSS.

He explained that the 'General Public' takes a more robust view that their security is protected.

This is shaped by the history of the UK. The people of UK take a more 'tolerant' view of the security paradigm and do not tolerate an intrusive security apparatus whereas the people of the Continent have faced and tolerated very intrusive security agencies in the shape of the Gestapo and Stassi.

He mentioned that the UK has faced IRA violence in the past and the public is more accommodating of the use of CCTV's. In fact the public demands that CCTV's be provided in their localities as a crime prevention tool. This is in contrast to the general outlook of the public in the United States who see the use of CCTV's as invading their privacy.

He explained the changing environment of the 1990s created a feeling in the Parliament for creating a Select Committee to 'oversee' the work of the intelligence agencies to make them more accountable. There was a time when the names of the heads of the intelligence agencies were not known to the general public but with the formation of the Select Committee on Intelligence and the requirement that its members sign the OSA, the environment between the Parliament and the intelligence agencies has become more trusting. The heads of the intelligence agencies became accountable to the Parliament.

In the current geo political environment, the threat perception and level is very high and the intelligence

agencies have to balance individual freedom with collective security. The Snowden disclosures have affected crime and the war on terror.

The face of terror can be multi faceted. The UK has seen the rise of 'Right Wing Extremism' as evidenced in the Ukrainian student's terror and hate attacks on Muslims in the UK. These types of crimes are committed to generate community tension.

In the present day, domestic security issues are closely tied in with UK's Foreign Policy. He explained that the issue of the UK national imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay has reverberated in the courts in the UK. The inmate's lawyer asked for documents to be produced in court that were provided to the UK intelligence agencies by the US intelligence agencies. The UK Government faced a dilemma because there is an agreement between the agencies that they share intelligence on the condition that it is not made public. The dilemma was resolved when the inmates lawyer stated that the documents had been produced in a US court and were 'public' documents and therefore the UK Government should not have any qualms in producing them before a UK court.

This incident had the potential to upset the international 'Principle of Intra Security Agencies Coordination'.

The debate on telecommunications monitoring is taking on importance. The concern and debate in the public is that should the agencies be able to see just the link of the messages or then go into the content without the judge's order and how long should the ISP keep the data. The volume of data that is going through is enormous and is a challenge to 'monitor'.

'Human Intelligence' is being put into organizations

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Parliamentarians briefed about the working of the NAO, UK

that are being targeted to get a realistic feedback. The challenge arises when 'actionable intelligence' is received and has to be acted upon. This raises the risk of revealing the sources that provided the 'actionable intelligence'.

Opposition parties do not have any role in security issues. The Labour Party has the National Policy Forum where the 'Trident Nuclear Missiles' issue was taken and debated but it was the Parliament where the issue was finally decided.

Most of the policies come from the party leadership. Consultations with the grass roots organizations of the Labour party do take place but on other issues and not necessarily on 'Terror/Security issues'.

The Labour Party has two sources of power:

1. National Executive Committee. It forms Sub Committees and
2. National Policy Forum. This body generates 'Policy Papers'.

The Labour party Headquarters has a staff of approximately 120 people that grows near the elections. These staff members work on various issues. Foreign Affairs and Defence Issues are formulated between the 'front benches' of the Government and the 'Shadow Government'. Openness of the Government departments is variable. The Government makes the decisions and the Opposition sets the framework in which the decisions are taken.

Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence and Defence-related Decisions, Policy and Implementation

The Role of the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy

Baroness Falkner of Margravine, Member of the Joint-Committee on National Security Strategy gave an

overview of the National Security Strategy (NSS). She gave a historical perspective and the background that led to the evolution of the NSS.

She explained that the last NSS was published in 1997 and despite 9/11, the NSS did not see any change in 13 years until 2010. UN 1373 and other laws were enacted and the general public was concerned about the enactment of these laws as they perceived them as very harsh.

Prime Minister Gordon Brown established a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament in 2010. The role of the Joint Committee is to review the NSS every 5 years and make recommendations.

Her opinion was that the Joint Committee working for 5 years is not advisable. It should formulate the NSS and then disband after 18 months of the NSS formulation. If an issue has to be tackled, it is advisable that a Committee is constituted, which meets and then disbands. NSS should be exactly that – Strategic.

The 2010 NSS was formulated in haste, stakeholders (the public) were not consulted and most importantly, it started in the last year of the previous Government and was completed in the present Government. There is a dichotomy of the NSS and what the Government is doing.

The UK is fighting two small wars but the Government is slashing the Defence Budget by 30%. This is not plausible and has resulted in a row with the Government. The Joint Committee members have had 6 to 8 meetings with the Government. Further interactions are required in addition to expert witnesses. Important questions have to be addressed pertaining to the amount of money the Government is willing and able to earmark to address the issues

The debate on telecommunications monitoring is taking on importance. The concern and debate in the public is that should the agencies be able to see just the link of the messages or then go into the content without the judge's order and how long should the ISP keep the data

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The current manner of working of the Joint Committee on NSS leaves a lot of room for improvement. The Parliament should have close interaction with the Treasury to ascertain the level of resources available. Treasury should be better prepared for allocating the requisite resources and should be more forthcoming

highlighted in the NSS.

National Security is seen with a 'broad brush'. There are areas which became a 'National Security' issue if not addressed in time. The recent rains in the UK washed away a train line in the south of the country that took four months to replace. That part of the country was effectively 'cut off' from the rest of the country. This in itself became a 'National Security' issue.

National Disasters and disease outbreaks degrade other capabilities. The 'Flu Pandemic' of 1917 is an example that killed millions. After the 'Cold War' The West thought that the spectre of a large-scale invasion on its land mass had diminished but with the recent Ukrainian Invasion this threat has re-emerged.

Another threat to the West is from the Jihadis' exodus to ISIS and their imminent influx. The threat of making these Jihadis stateless who have gone to ISIS to fight will not be feasible because of a number of international obligations and domestic laws.

The current manner of working of the Joint Committee on NSS leaves a lot of room for improvement. The Parliament should have close interaction with the Treasury to ascertain the level of resources available. Treasury should be better prepared for allocating the requisite resources and should be more forthcoming.

Most of the departments operate in 'silos'. Treasury attends the Joint Committee of the NSS as and when necessary. The Joint Committee has access to only the agenda of the NSC. The meetings of the Joint Committee of NSS are usually held after 1430 hrs and these are frequently interrupted by voting. The Joint Committee of NSS has chairs of three Select

Committees and should include the chairman of the Treasury Select Committee. Joint Committees are always chaired by the House of Commons. In the current Joint Committee of NSS, the number of the members of the House of Commons is higher but the attendance by the members of the House of Lords is higher.

The UK's view of Pakistan is 'containment'. In the 'counter terror' dimension, the goal is to limit Pakistan's influence in the UK.

The Role of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)

Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, QC MP, Chair, Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) and Committee Members briefed us about the workings of the ISC.

They opined that there had been a 'revolution' in the powers of the ISC over time and that the ISC can scrutinize the operations information of the intelligence agencies. The agencies cannot refuse divulging information to the ISC and only the Prime Minister can refuse to give information and that too on National Security grounds. This trust has been earned and the members of the ISC have to be signatories to the Official Secrets Act.

The ISC secretariat can visit any of the Agencies and review any of the files they require. There are quarterly reviews of the Agencies performance. The Parliament can refuse the appointment or referral of the ISC members made by the Prime Minister. The Chair of the ISC can be from either the Government or the Opposition.

The ISC started off with a staff of 15 and currently has 50 people. The ISC pushes that the Agencies should



L-R: Mr. Owen Jenkins, Director FCO on South Asia and Afghanistan and Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, President PILDAT

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L-R: Mr. David Adersen, QC, Independent Reviewer of UK Anti-Terrorism Legislation with Mr. Omar Ayub Khan, MNA

work within the confines of the Human Rights. The intelligence reports provided to the ISC can be relied on to be accurate with a confidence level of approximately 95%. Redaction is a negotiation process.

The ISC currently has 9 members. The ISC was created by an Act of Parliament and due to the confidential information provided, some of the reports go directly to the Prime Minister. ISC's budget is given by the Government.

The ISC members explained that the nature of the Committee required that the ISC should be bi-partisan and that integrity and national interest should be put first at all times. Most of the sessions of the ISC are held in private. Public hearings are held and are useful because it shows the limits of what the Intelligence Agencies and ISC can actually do.

Scrutinizing the Home office Policy and Expenditure

Rt Hon. Keith Vaz MP, Chair, Home Affairs Committee, gave a briefing to the delegation on how the Select Committee scrutinizes Home Office Policy and Expenditure.

He explained that new rules enacted in 2010 have enabled members to contest elections to be on the Select Committees. It is no longer the prerogative of the 'Whips' to allocate the committees to MPs.

Usually 'Hot Topic' issues are heard and the Select Committee (SC) meets weekly. The 'Terrorism' inquiry was put together in 3 days. The impetus was provided because the issue at hand was 'Terrorism' and this issue is such that it galvanizes and unites both the Government and the Opposition.

The recent 'Exclusion Order' (EO) issued by the Government will not hold in any court of law within the UK or abroad because it is in violation of multiple multi

lateral agreements. The EO entails that Jihadists who have gone from the UK to fight for ISIS will not be allowed to come back into the UK rendering them in effect – stateless. This was done in medieval Tudor England. In France 20% of the Jihadists are converts to Islam from Christianity.

The issue of EO is not palatable because it set a precedent for other states to make their citizens 'stateless' who they do not desire and will be the responsibility of the country they are incarcerated in or have been given asylum status. The EO measure may be seen as though the West is losing the 'War On Terror.'

The Bill was put to the House on December 2, 2014, It would be debated on December 3, 2014. There has been no scrutiny on the legislation or the language.

He explained that the National Security Advisor does not come to the Parliament on the plea that he is an Advisor to the Prime Minister and is not required to appear before the Parliament.

During the hearing, the Mr. Keith Vaz posed a question to the witness about the practicality of the EO and how other states would react to it by making their own 'undesirable' citizens stateless by invoking the EO. The witness did not have a coherent reply to it and replied that it was something the Foreign Office and Home Office would have to deal with.

Scrutinizing the Defence Policy and Expenditure

Mr. Rory Stewart MP, Chair, Defence Committee, and Committee Members gave a briefing about how the Defence select Committee scrutinizes the Defence Policy and Expenditure.

He explained that the Defence Committee can only

The ISC currently has 9 members. The ISC was created by an Act of Parliament and due to the confidential information provided, some of the reports go directly to the Prime Minister. ISC's budget is given by the Government. Most of the sessions of the ISC are held in private

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The Defence Committee members are basically 'commentators' but they can take the Government and the Ministry of Defence to task. The Defence Committee meets twice per week. It has 7 full time staff and consultants to help the Committee members in their job

recommend to the Parliament as to how much the Defence expenditure should be or if any cuts are required, it's the prerogative of the Executive to either accept or reject the Select Committee recommendations.

The system in the UK is more informal as compared to the US and has room for improvement from 'lessons learnt'. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has more of an oversight role on all expenditures of the Government.

The Defence Committee members are basically 'commentators' but they can take the government and the Ministry of Defence to task. The Defence Committee meets twice per week. It has 7 full time staff and consultants to help the Committee members in their job. But even this staffing level is insufficient to do a good enough job and make the Government accountable.

The reports generated by the Defence Committee are unanimous because of the trust between the members has been developed. Mr. Dai Howard mentioned that in Pakistan and the system has changed for the better in the last 10 years. He explained that the members of the Select Committees are elected by the MP's through secret ballot and the Chairperson's are elected by the Parliament.

Scrutinizing Major Defence Projects

Ms. Helen Holden, Audit Manager, Value for Money Defence, National Audit Office and **Ms. Karoly Juhasz**, Audit Principal, National Audit Office briefed us about how the national Accounts office (NAO) scrutinizes the major defence projects and expenditures. They provided a handout of their presentations.

They explained that a team of analysts analyses the defence expenditures and reports to the Comptroller and the Auditor General. The position of the Auditor General and Comptroller are combined into one office and the officer is an Officer of the House of Commons. The Officer is nominated by the Prime Minister and approved by the Parliament.

The Comptroller and the Accountant General is appointed as the auditor under statute and reports to the Parliament whether the accounts are accurate and free from bias and that the approved budget has been used as intended by the Parliament. The members of NAO are not civil servants and do not report to a minister. The NAO conducts annual audits of all government departments and other public bodies. The departments NAO audits have to report annually to the Parliament about how it has spent the budget approved by the Parliament. 60 value-for money reports are generated. In 2013-2014 the NAO audited spending and revenue of £1 trillion across 427 accounts.

The goal of NAO with its team of qualified analysts is to help improve government performance by identifying wasteful expenditures and making sure that the projects approved and being executed are the best value for money projects. The NAO's work with the PAC saved almost £1.1 billion in 2013.

The NAO's defence team is made up of about 60 multi disciplinary team members. This team concentrates on financial audit, review of assumptions underpinning the affordability of the Equipment Plan, review of the MoD's Major Projects Report, value for money studies and other investigations and reports assigned to the team.

The 'Resource Accounts' (RA) of the departments are audited. The RA record the expenditure – current and capital and the balance sheet items – assets and liabilities. NAO uses a double entry accounting system. The audit methodology used is risk and sampling based. The RA comments on other items pertaining to the departments – governance, pays, Board of Directors, losses and special payments. Qualifications are made on items especially inventory items if they are not according to the plan or budget. Estimated projections of possible clean ups and accruals is made to bring accuracy into the budgetary estimates.

The NAO shifted from cash based accounting to accrual based double entry accounting in 2000-2001. It took 5 years to switch completely from cash based to accrual based accounting.

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When the Government acquires a defence system, its spare parts and capital expenditures are forecasted and the purchases are staggered to align it with the time when the spares will be required over the lifetime of the asset. Defence Equipment & Support and Defence Infrastructure Organization (DES/DIO) are responsible for the procurement, development and maintenance of military equipment, land and buildings. DES/DIO is closely linked to the Front Line Commands (FLC) (Navy, Air Force, Army and Joint forces Commands). DES/DIO and the FLC liaise with each other about the defence capital requirements.

Until recently DES/DIO used to manage the production, acquisition and delivery of the assets but the money was given to the FLC's. The money was not ring fenced and could be reallocated by the FLC's but this has changed. Now the FLC's are being forced to be an integral part of the acquisition and production process, in essence making them project managers of the process to make sure that the project is On Budget, In Time and According to Specifications. In addition to this the money allocated to the FLC's will be 'ring fenced' implying that they will not be necessarily 'free' to reallocate it between projects.

The UK's Ministry of Defence budget as stipulated by NATO is 2% of its GDP. As is the case in an accounting system, variations do exist between the planned and actual expenditure incurred. The variation between the forecast and the actual availability of resources for the MoD last year was £17 billion. The primary reason for this variation was the deficit the out going Labour Government has left. There was a shortage of money to take the planned projects to fruition.

The NAO generates a 'Statement of Acquisitions' (SOA) over 10 years. The purpose of the SOA is to verify the affordability of its forecast and to focus on whether its assumptions at the time of making the forecasts were valid and accurate.

The NAO faces problems when estimating resources for equipment support because the nature of the equipment has variations and it can be spread over multiple years or be used up in a compressed time frame due to attrition in a combat situation.

The NAO actively monitors and audits the 'Equipment plan' (EP). The EP is the MOD's forecast of what it expects its defence acquisitions to be over the upcoming 10 year period. The MoD has started publishing an annual statement since 2012 on the affordability of its EQ and it is the responsibility of the NAO to audit the reasonableness and the consistency of

the assumptions underpinning the EP at its inception. The EP has been incorporated as an integral part of the oversight function because it was observed that the MoD had been overspending and had traditionally been negligent in adhering to the allocated budget. This had resulted in projects being cancelled or postponed which in turn resulted in cost overruns and delays and resultantly costing the exchequer. The review process will help MoD to be cautious with its budget allocations by adhering to the forecasts and reporting the progress transparently.

The EP is 'audited' by selecting a sample of approximately 25 of the largest equipment procurement and equipment support projects and verifying the 'reasonableness' of the assumptions made by the project teams and cross checking the original forecasts against the actual progress by examining the cost forecasts and risk registers and by interviewing with the relevant project teams and the Head Office.

The 'Major Projects Report' (MPR) is presented annually to the Parliament. The report has the relevant data on the cost, time and performance of the largest projects that the MoD has undertaken, together with less detailed data on the projects that the MoD has not yet taken the decision to undertake. The NAO's MPR represents an analysis of the data provided by the MoD and 'key findings'. The MPR was implemented as a result of Parliament's 'request' that the NAO prepare a performance report on MoD's track record of how it performs in relation to the criteria of 'time, cost and capability' of its largest equipment procurement projects. The MPR is published along with the EP.

The objective of these two reports is to provide an analysis for the Parliament to verify the procurement and support capability of MoD's and the UK's Defence

The UK's Ministry of Defence budget as stipulated by NATO is 2% of its GDP. As is the case in an accounting system, variations do exist between the planned and actual expenditure incurred. The primary reason for this variation was the deficit the out going Labour Government has left

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capability. The MPR is prepared after a review and analysis of the project's forecasts against original approvals and the variance analysis of the budget with respect to time, performance and the allocated budget. The objective of this variance analysis is to ascertain whether the 'Major Projects Acquisition' are achieving 'value for money'. The analysis and publication of the MPR has forced all 'stake holders' to review their performance and has resulted in a decrease in variation between the original forecast and the actual performance translating into a cost saving.

The Value For Money (VFM) Programme is undertaken by the NAO to assess the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of various elements of the MOD with a focus on the 'transformation program'. The most recent report was on Army 2020.

The NAO is equipped to conduct VFM analysis through legal cover. The law stipulates that the C&AG should execute an analysis of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of Government departments and other bodies. The Act enables the C&AG to access all documents and information that is necessary to conduct its analysis.

The methodology NAO adopts to conduct these VFM studies entails agreeing on a set of questions with the C&AG and a methodology to answer the questions. Usually a mixture of interviews, documents review, financial analysis, surveys and case studies are used. Most of the studies look at a set of variables that are common across various Government departments that deal with long term projects. VFM studies do not look at the assumptions of the acquisitions but concentrate on the time, cost and capability variables.

As an example, the aircraft carrier acquisition program

In the UK the notion of the 'Supplementary Budget' exists but is used very sparingly. If a department exceeds its budget for the year, it has to get approval of retrospective spending from the Parliament during the year but the department has to give very substantive reasons for over spending



L-R: Syeda Zahra Wadood Fatemi, MNA and Mr. Sufyan Yusuf, MNA

was originally forecast to cost £3.5 billion but eventually cost £6.1 billion. This is a variation of £2.5 billion. The benchmark is set to calculate the variance against the original procurement plan.

The NAO conducts investigations in response to requests from MP's or members of the public who raise a flag pertaining to issues relating to money or any irregularity. The identity of the 'whistle blower' is kept confidential.

The NAO audits the intelligence agencies and the reports are laid before Parliament before publication. The NAO's primary responsibility is to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC).

An interesting fact brought out during the Q&A session was pertaining to the 'Supplementary Budget'. In the UK the notion of the 'Supplementary Budget' exists but is used very sparingly. If a department exceeds its budget for the year, it has to get approval of retrospective spending from the Parliament during the year but the department has to give very substantive reasons for over spending. Over spending approvals are taken in February of the same year and the Budget presented in March for the next year. The PAC employs former employees for their 'institutional knowledge' to highlight areas of potential improvement by turning 'poachers into game keepers'.

The Role of Non-Traditional Intelligence Oversight Bodies, NGOs, Transnational Organizations, Civil Society and the Media

The delegation was briefed about the role of the civil society in monitoring the intelligence agencies and overseeing their activities that leads to greater transparency and accountability.

A panellist explained that extremism is an 'all society problem' and an 'all people problem'. It knows no

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boundaries. They work with former extremists who have shunned their previous lives and have integrated into society to 'reach out' to existing extremists in an effort to convince them to shun extremism. They never approach the extremist directly but wait for the extremist to reach out through 'social media' or other channels. The identity of the extremist is verified through a number of sources and then he/she is encouraged to leave.

Educational media tools have been built with the help of former extremists to counter the 'siren call' of the extremist propaganda and the extremists or 'potential targets' are given a 'counter narrative' through 'direct messages'. Some of the extremists who are online respond positively to respect being shown to them. It causes them to 'pause' and think about what their adopted 'ideology' means.

Some of these extremists have reached out for help and have been helped to shun extremism because they are disenchanted with the cause they initially adopted. Most of the people who adopt extremism do so for a sense of 'belonging' and a sense of 'identity'. Sense narratives have more appeal to them.

The individuals who adopt extremism of any shade have a set of common denominators that are common amongst all of them but creating a psychological profile of a 'typical' extremist has not worked and is a 'red herring'.

The worrying factor in the ISIS phenomenon is that young educated women are being drawn to it. ISIS is propagating the idea of building a 'caliphate state' and is targeting women to help them in the support role. In the

The challenge for the UK media is the 'internationalization' of the media. There is pressure on the domestic media to 'break' the story first. If the domestic media does not take the initiative, then nothing prevents the international media or the social media to take the initiative. In the 'ratings war', breaking the story first carries a lot of weight

other 'jihadist' movements the role of women was non-existent because they concentrated on fighting a 'jihad' and it was simple male dominated combat operation, not a 'multi faceted' state building enterprise requiring a diverse skills set. It is estimated that women make up almost 10% of the ISIS numbers.

Another panellist explained the rise of 'cyber terrorism' and the 'awareness' of the people in general about the role of the intelligence agencies. People question the intelligence agencies reports. The 'Rigby Report' would not have been published 10 years ago without the intelligence agency compromising its operations. The change in attitude in the intelligence agencies took place when the Intelligence Agencies chiefs appeared before the ISC. This heralded an era of accountability.

The 'Defence Advice Notice' (DAN) is generated if the press reporting 'bumps' against possible national security issues. It is voluntary and is sent by the editors to the concerned authorities for advice. The press sees this as better than censorship through legislation.

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The UK Government is coming around to the idea that more media openness is better. In the Q&A session with the panellists, the panellists opined that the ISC needs credibility by exercising more powers. It needs more interaction and the 'oversight and accountability' role should be more open.

The 'Snowden Incident' tested the system to its limits. The Guardian newspaper went public followed by other media outlets much to the chagrin of the Government and agencies. The panellists felt that the ISC report in early 2000 was not detailed enough and the ISC did not go looking for details.

National Security and the Conservative Party

Mr. Geoffrey Clifton-Brown MP, briefed the delegation about the views of the Conservative Party pertaining to National Security.

He opined that the security situation in Afghanistan should be normalized as soon as possible and was supportive of the role of the ISC and mentioned that the Conservative Party has an important input into the process.

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In his opinion, 'Radicalization Prevention Strategy' can work if 'pluralism' is promoted at all levels.

The UK has become a multi polar society and the strategy to combat radicalization has to reflect this reality. According to an estimate more than 500 people have travelled to ISIS dominated areas from the UK in the last one year. This is a worrying trend.

The intelligence agencies are identifying people who have gone to the ISIS areas. As of now there are no security checks but the Government is thinking of an 'Exit Control List'. The dilemma is what to do with the 500 people who have already left. If they choose to return, then they will have to be interrogated and if they have broken any laws, they will have to be jailed.

Another important threat that has taken on immense significance is 'cyber crime'. In a world that is increasingly digitally integrated, state and non-state actors try and conduct espionage or subversive activities using cyber terrorism. The UK has instituted COBRA to deal with severe threats. If the country faces an extremely severe threat, the PM chairs COBRA's meetings.

The Conservative Party has a Sub Committee of the overall Party Committee that looks at legislation in the normal course. When elections are on the horizon, this Sub Committee recommends issues to be made part of the party manifesto. The panellist admitted that the relationship between UK's Parliament and Pakistan's Parliament are not at all close and this is because no body has reached out to the MPs.

The role of Pakistan's Embassy in UK is minimal and the Ambassador has a minimal 'footprint' in the Parliament. One of the reasons for Pakistan's poor perception among the MPs is the minimal contact with UK MPs.



L-R: Mr. Omar Ayub Khan, MNA and Senator Mohsin Leghari in a briefing at the London Borough of Waltham Forest

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UK Anti-Terror Legislation

David Anderson QC, independent Reviewer of UK Terrorism legislation, briefed the delegation about the evolution of the position of the Independent Reviewer (IR) and of 'Anti Terror Legislation' (ATL).

The IR was nominated and appointed by the Executive. Before Mr. Anderson, Lord Carlyle was appointed in 1999. In the future, the Home Secretary will advertise and 6 applicants will be interviewed. The final selection and appointment will be made by the Home Secretary.

The function of the IR is to inform the public and Government about liberty and the strength of the law. The IR is a servant of the Parliament, draws his salary from the executive and reports to the Home Secretary.

The ATL law was introduced and enacted in 1974 and at the time it had a sunset clause of 6 months to 1 year. Since 2000 ATL had become permanent but the Parliament has required that ATL should be reviewed.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIMS) requires an annual review as stipulated by section 20 of the Act. It requires constraints to be imposed on the person whom the Home Secretary believes to be engaged in terrorism related activities. These constraints are reviewable in court.

After TPIMS was enacted, it was observed that the law was not working and the Independent Reviewer conducted a review. Ten suggestions were suggested by him that were approved and implemented.

The Independent Reviewer works with the Select Committee on law. Immediately after 9/11 tough laws were enacted but over time the severity of the laws has decreased and they are becoming more open and less

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harsh.

The legal position pertaining to 'Exclusion Order' is that it is not maintainable and a more palatable option would be to have a process of 'Managed Return'. The 'Exclusion Order' can be described as an 'announcement waiting for a policy formulation'. In UK, laws are being constantly debated as the civil society and lawyers approach courts and challenge the laws. In Europe, civil society does not challenge the enacted laws. In UK the conviction rate of terror related cases is 80% but the number of cases is small. To successfully prosecute terrorism cases a close liaison is required between the Prosecution and the Police.

Cyber Security

Caroline Baylon, Research Associate, Science, Technology and Cyber Security Department, gave a holistic briefing to the delegation about Cyber Security, Cyber Infrastructure, Cyber Space, Cyber Security in Africa. Cyber espionage is dependent upon 'Zero Day Vulnerabilities' (ZDV), which means that the vulnerability of a system becomes on the very day it is made operational. Cyber terrorists hack into the system and exploit the systems weaknesses.

The attacks can be conducted by state actors although non state actors can conduct these activities as well but it requires a lot of resources and sophistication. The United States, United Kingdom and Israel lead the countries most active in cyber espionage.

The United States is a leader in ZDV's. It maps out what computers are being used and then targets them for their vulnerabilities to extract information. Various cyber weapons are used and in fact the tools of the computer system being exploited are used against it for espionage. The targeted computers audio-visual

There is very fine line between cyber espionage and cyber warfare. Cyber attacks can be targeted against power utilities causing cascading power outages over large areas and causing massive disruptions and economic loss as well as creating a national security threat

devices, camera, keyboard key strokes, blue tooth and other tools are used to eavesdrop. Weaknesses are found in an 'Air Gap' and then exploited. An 'Air Gap' is when a system is completely isolated from outside interference but a careless workers work habits are monitored and his potential USB stick device is used for accessing information.

There is a debate in the cyber world whether to 'patch' or 'not to patch' i.e. provide upgrades to older systems. This in itself can lead to potential 'Trojan Horse malware' being inserted into the previously isolated system and making it vulnerable. The argument at the moment is prevailing on the side of not 'patching' older legacy systems.

There is very fine line between cyber espionage and cyber warfare. Cyber attacks can be targeted against power utilities causing cascading power outages over large areas and causing massive disruptions and economic loss as well as creating a national security threat. The UK at the moment does not have a cyber security policy but should have one because a nation has to prepare for tomorrows battle today.

Visit to London Borough of Waltham Forest

Ms. Jena Musa, Community Safety Programme Manager, **Mr. Alastair Macorkindale**, PC **Mr. Daniel Fludgate**, **Mr. Mike Jervis**, **Mr. Martin Esom** and **Councillor Liaquat Ali** briefed the delegation about Waltham Forest and especially mentioned the deprivation in the south of the Borough.

There is a strong link of the community with Pakistan. 12% of the community members are of Pakistani origin. There is simmering tension between the local community and the Police. In London terms housing is inexpensive and this attracts many people who settle here for a short time but then move away once they progress economically. This transient population creates a lot of 'churn' and challenges community cohesion.

The recent census showed that the population growth rate was +20%. Hosting the Olympic Games in East London provided an economic impetus to East London and Waltham Forest Borough in particular.

The Borough has a history of Radical Islamic Groups that were later proscribed. In 2005 there were racial riots that caused a lot of community tension and economic harm to the Borough. When the 'Heathrow Conspiracy' was uncovered, 20 people were arrested and out of which 2/3rd were from Waltham Forest Borough.

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The presence of 'Radical Islamic Thinking' has created tension in the community. According to an estimate 5 people have gone to Syria/Iraq to join ISIS from the Waltham Forest Borough and even 1 person going there and coming back to perpetrate an act of terror is too much

The presence of 'Radical Islamic Thinking' has created tension in the community. According to an estimate 5 people have gone to Syria/Iraq to join ISIS from the Waltham Forest Borough and even 1 person going there and coming back to perpetrate an act of terror is too much.

The Police has tried to reach out to the community and the political leadership has been very supportive of the program. The Central Government gave money to Waltham Forest in 2010/11 as part of 'Operation Overt' to engage young people and move them away from radical thinking by giving them an alternate counter argument and possible solutions to better themselves.

The programme has faced challenges in engaging the community and its cohesion, capacity building projects with young people and integration with mosques. When the new Conservative Government was elected, the focus shifted from 'Community Cohesion' to 'Prevention'. The goal was to work and engage with vulnerable people before they became radicalized.

The 'Prevent Strategy' is a part of a programme through which the Home office funds the local community programmes. As part of the 'outreach' program the officers tried to ascertain the reason for the 'vulnerable' young people to become 'radicalized'. One of the reasons was the Foreign Policy of UK but viewpoint this has evolved over time. At present it has shifted to ISIS.

Another programme aimed at providing a 'counter narrative' to the vulnerable people is the 'Digital Resilience Project'. It works with secondary schools and targets young students. As part of the interaction with students through this programme it became clear that the students have clear views regarding media.

They mistrust 'Authority', 85% of the respondents said that they would go to YouTube, Facebook for information. This has created a problem because young people are increasingly relying on 'cyber space' to get their information and form opinions based upon the information they retrieve.

Cyber Space is the realm that the 'Extremists' target to influence young vulnerable people. It increases the importance of putting out a 'counter narrative' on cyber space so that the people being targeted by extremists are able to view and read an alternative to that the 'Extremists' are offering.

The Government has injected a 'Citizenship Programme' into the school curriculum to teach students about what it means to be 'British' and the 'value system'. The Somali Community indicated its concern about the 'recruiting drive' in Waltham Forest by Al Shabab terrorist organization based in Somalia. This indicates how 'global' terrorism has become.

As part of the 'Prevent' strategy, the work done by the 'Prevent Programme' is tied into the local school curriculum. The 'National Prevent Strategy' concentrates on ideology, Institutions, Individuals but on the ground at the local level, the programme has to be tailored to match the local requirements.

The Police is pursuing the 'Channel programme'. In this programme, the Police monitor and discuss the people who have been identified as potential candidates for terrorists. These people are confronted by the Police. There have been cases in the local community where women have been the catalysts for radicalization.

PC **Daniel Fludgate**, explained the work done by the Counter Terror Force. Counter Terror concentrates on Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. He explained that 'terrorism' is not just a 'by-product' of economic deprivation and gave the example of the Glasgow bombing where the perpetrators were successful doctors.

The 'Counter Terror' strategy can work when there is Police 'Buy In' and community support. **Mr. Mike Jarvis**, Director, Active Change Foundation, explained that 'Prevent' is an integral part of their organizations programme.

He explained the methodology extremists use to change a vulnerable person from the mainstream to become a 'radical'. The process starts by creating fear, creating resentment against the system, initiating a desire for revenge and finally creating an attachment to

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their 'radical' cause. A radical idea cannot be defeated, it has to be dismantled. 'Radicals' require 'space' to be provided to them by the community and it is very important to stand with the local community to give it guidance and deny the 'radicals' the 'space' they desire. He mentioned that the local mosques (approximately 17) in Waltham Forest have been helpful even though they have not adopted the 'prevent' strategy. The attendance in the mosques has been increasing over time and they help in pointing out potential 'vulnerable' people.

Another interesting programme used to identify potential 'extremists' or 'vulnerable' members is the 'Family Programme' (FP). FP is a European Programme that concentrates on Primary School students who 'apparently' know more about gangs as compared to their peers. The increased knowledge may be because the student has been a victim of gang activity or then because someone in their immediate social structure is affiliated with a gang. The same programme is being used to identify potential extremists. A person's journey to become radicalized can take a number of paths.

A 'vulnerable' person becomes a target of extremists because the person feels 'disenfranchised' from the system and 'dislocated' from opportunities. The challenges being faced to combat extremism have

increased over time. 'Stealth Radicalization' through cyber space is one of the biggest challenges being faced and is completely 'hidden'. Attempts are being made to target the 'vulnerable' being influenced by 'Stealth Radicalization' through the 'Family programme'.

Meeting With Owen Jenkins, Director, South Asia & Afghanistan, Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Mr. Owen Jenkins, Director, South Asia and Afghanistan, briefed the delegation about UK's relationship with Pakistan.

He underlined the importance of parliamentary interactions. The Speaker of the National Assembly had visited his UK counterpart last year.

Substantive issues that dominate relations between the two countries are Human Rights, Blasphemy and Afghanistan. Trade is a cementing agent and the bilateral trade target for 2015 has been set at £3 billion. He mentioned that British businesses find it hard to invest due to security, red tape, etc. It was pointed out to him that Pakistan ranks higher on the World Bank's 'Ease of Doing Business' compared to India. He mentioned that the Prime Minister's Energy Dialogue. Efforts should be made to revitalize the Board of Investment and it should use the offices of Pakistan's Embassies and High Commissions to promote trade.



A Group Photo of Study Visit Participants with the CPA-UK Branch team at the Parliament House, UK

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Radicalization differs from country to country It starts with a grievance or a crisis that leads to a search for an 'identity'. The 'ideology' channelizes the grievance, and finally when these 'like minded' people come together they create an 'echo chamber' where they reinforce each other's views

Home-Grown Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programmes

Professor Peter Neumann, Professor of Security Studies, King's College London, & Director, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, briefed the delegation about home-grown radicalization and the de-radicalization programmes initiated to counter the trend.

A database of more than 500 fighters has been compiled who have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria for ISIS. These individuals have been active on social media and their activities are being tracked. 50 to 100 of these individuals were interviewed on social media or then in Turkey.

Radicalization differs from country to country according to local circumstances. It starts with a grievance or a crisis that leads to a search for an 'identity'. The 'ideology' channelizes the grievance, and finally when these 'like minded' people come together they create an 'echo chamber' where they reinforce each other's views.

The foundation of vulnerable people gravitating towards fighting in Syria started with a narrative of defending your own people against Assad's in 2012/13. At that time it was perceived as non-ideological and non-problematic. In 2013-2014, the 'narrative' evolved and morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Its aim was the creation of a new Caliphate and fed on the feeling of 'Anti Shia' being felt by many of the Sunnis against the discriminatory policies of Maliki's government in Iraq. In September 2014, the rhetoric from ISIS turned against the West because of the strikes launched against it. The ideology of ISIS appeals to a cross of the social strata and can become a much more potent threat as compared to other radical

movements.

Before ISIS declared itself, a lot of the financial flows towards it came from the Gulf Region. In UK the number of charities for Syria sky-rocketed as the fighting intensified against Assad. Many of these charities were fake charities and were fronts for a more radical movement. The real identity of these charities was uncovered using social media. Trucks purported to take relief goods to Syria from UK were identified at ISIS depots.

The ethnic composition of fighters going to ISIS is a function of the local ethnic composition. Indigenous white converts to Islam make up 15-20% of ISIS. Women make up another 15-20% of ISIS. Globally an estimated 16,000 to 17,000 fighters have gone to Syria/Iraq in the past 3 years. 60-70% are from Arab/Middle Eastern countries. 20-25% are from Western countries. In absolute terms, approximately 3000 fighters are from Tunisia, 2500 from Saudi Arabia, 500-1000 from Pakistan, 500-800 from UK.

As a comparison, 20,000 fighters went to fight the Soviets during the 'Afghan Jihad' from 1979-1987 (a period of 8 years). After the 'Afghan Jihad' of the 1980's this is the greatest mobilization of foreign fighters and it appears that the cycle is repeating itself and the world will see many more attacks in the coming years conducted by these trained fighters. In the initial stages and starting months of 2012, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait supported these fighters but have now realized that their policy was wrong and that these fighters pose a serious threat to their governments. Turkey allowed these fighters to operate from its soil in the initial stages of the Syrian conflict but has come to realize that they have become entrenched on their territory. Turkey will now have to retake these towns situated within its territory but it will be difficult because 60-70% of the people in these towns are ethnic Syrians.

Financial flows to ISIS is through physical means. 'Hawala' is not used for fear of being tracked. ISIS evolved out of the Syrian conflict but at the time the Western world and the rest of the world did not pay close attention to it. The US was going through with its Presidential Elections and the focus was on domestic politics. The lack of attention towards Syria created a 'missed opportunity.' Had the world reacted faster and more appropriately, the ISIS threat could have been nipped in the bud. With Syrian forces demoralized, a power vacuum was created in many of the cities which was filled by non state actors. As the conflict raged in Syria, Assad warned the world of the rising specter of ISIS. In the Western capitals, the threat ISIS posed was not taken seriously and in fact, the ideals of ISIS were

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not originally from ISIS itself or for that matter from Syria.

The figure head of ISIS is Ahmad Musa Jibril who is a Salifist and anti Shia. He is based in the US and is fluent in English. At present ISIS is not a monolith entity and has weaknesses. The large influx of fighters has created tensions in the communities they are living in. The best houses (abandoned by the Alawites), the best facilities in town have been taken over by these foreign fighters and this is creating friction and resentment in the locals. The foreign fighters are telling the Syrians and Iraqis how to run their affairs. A large number of these foreign fighters do not even speak Arabic. These fighters may be good fighters but are not good administrators. The administration function is being looked after by former Iraqi Army officers. The foreign fighters have an extremely strict and harsh religious outlook which they are imposing on the locals and the locals are chaffing under their 'rule'.

ISIS realizes it has limitations and has entered into coalitions with the local influential forces. The threat ISIS may face in the future is the local 'pragmatic' groups rising against it and this scenario can unfold as ISIS is short of financial resources to administer the towns under its control. It sells oil from the well heads under its control at steep discounts and with the recent drop in global oil prices it will be forced to sell oil at US \$6 per barrel from the US \$10 per barrel it was selling at a few months ago.

The comparison of ISIS controlled areas with Taliban controlled areas in Afghanistan is not appropriate because the areas under Taliban control were eking out a living at subsistence levels. The Iraqis and Syrians living in ISIS controlled areas have much higher living standard and have higher expectations from the

'administration' governing them which in this case is ISIS. At the moment ISIS does not have the administrative skill sets to deliver and that is the reason they are trying to attract people with medical, administrative, staff and managerial skill sets from across the world by appealing to the Muslims to set up a 'Caliphate'.

ISIS presents the most existential threat to the Middle East region in the last 100 years and the worlds hyper power – the US is not leading in the region for fear of becoming embroiled in another protracted conflict which may entail 'boots on the ground'.

ISIS realizes it has limitations and has entered into coalitions with the local influential forces. The threat ISIS may face in the future is the local 'pragmatic' groups rising against it and this scenario can unfold as ISIS is short of financial resources

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Conclusions

The lessons learnt were:

1. A multi dimensional Anti Terror programme that incorporates working with the communities at the grass roots level is required. Radicalization can only be countered with a 'counter narrative' and not force alone. Methods of outreach to potential 'radicals' have to be fine-tuned and take into account rapidly changing technology.
2. The Government has to be proactive at all times with a very clear stated strategy as part of its NSS as to how it sees 'radicalization' and how it should react and respond to it as part of an implementation 'tactical' plan.
3. A 'Standing Committee on Intelligence' similar to its UK counter part should be formed in Pakistan's Parliament. It should incorporate all Pakistan intelligence agencies and can play an effective oversight role.
4. Standing Committees on Defence of Pakistan's Parliament should scrutinize defence acquisitions by calling in experts to help and guide them. They should ensure that the defence procurements give the most 'value for money'. Pakistan has a large defence industry and the Standing Committees' on Defence Production of Pakistan's Parliament should compel the relevant production organizations to conduct an analysis of the cost effectiveness of our defence production capabilities. This can be done by asking the Auditor General of Pakistan to strengthen its capabilities by hiring professional accountants who can work closely with the relevant defence related industries and services. Cost effectiveness, quality and meeting the requirements of our Defence Forces should be incorporated into the goals.
5. The Auditor General of Pakistan and the Ministry of Finance should push for incorporating 'Double Entry Accounting' as part of its 'Project To Improve Financial Reporting and Audit' (PIFRA) programme to improve accounting methodologies within the Government.
6. Pakistan's 'foot print' with the UK parliamentarians is non-existent. It was felt at all interactions that other than Dr. Maleeha Lodhi who served as High Commissioner and is very highly regarded by all MPs due to her diligent work and constant interaction with UK MP', the other High Commissioners have not reached out to the MPs and interacted with them effectively enough. This is resulting in Pakistan's view-point not being adequately represented in the British Parliament.

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Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of Defence & National Security – Glimpses from the Study Visit to United Kingdom

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Views by Ms. Zahra Wadood Fatimi, MNA

Ensuring parliamentary oversight on Security and Intelligence agencies is a symbol of a strong and successful democracy. This check becomes all the more important in the developing countries such as Pakistan where civil-military relations have remained dysfunctional. The main theme is to ensure proper check upon the authority and activities of the security agencies, without compromising the performance, efficiency and secrecy of their operations while simultaneously ensuring civil liberties and regard for human rights.

In order to learn from a successful democratic model of the developed world, PILDAT organized Parliamentary Strengthening Partnership Program for the members of the parliament in the UK from 2-5 December 2014.

The objective of the programme was to gain an insight into how Parliament, Government institutions, political parties and external organizations contribute to the formulation of UK's national security strategy and the accountability of defence spending and intelligence activities.

The programme also provided a great opportunity to the Pakistan delegation to brief their counterparts regarding the government's efforts to counter militancy at home through the successful military operation, Zarb-e-Azb and the rehabilitation efforts for the dislocated persons with the UK side.

The delegation also highlighted the Government's efforts at various multilateral fora to bring about peace and stability in the region, especially with reference to Afghanistan.

Programme Objectives

The delegation participated in a series of discussions, workshops and briefings on various topics such as:

- i. Parliamentary oversight of intelligence and defence related-decisions, policy and implementation
- ii. Government mechanisms for decision making on national security
- iii. The changing face of national and international security
- iv. The role of political parties and think tanks in influencing policy-making/makers

The prime objective was to bring about greater transparency through a superior role of the Parliament in not merely supervising the Security and Intelligence agencies but also guiding their strategic direction. This will not only make them accountable to the public representatives but will also win the trust of the public.

Intelligence and Security Committee

The salient features of this Committee are as under:

- i. The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC), established through an Act (Intelligence Services Act 1994), is the main Parliamentary instrument to examine the policy, administration and expenditure of the UK's three main intelligence and security agencies - Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and the Government communications Headquarters (GCHQ).
- ii. Attempts were made over the years to improve its effectiveness and efficiency, while enhancing the parliamentary control. The Justice and Security Act 2013 reformed the ISC through the following measures:
 - a. Making it a Committee of the Parliament
 - b. Providing greater powers
 - c. Increasing its remit (including oversight of operational activity and the wider intelligence and security activities of Government)
- iii. The Committee also provides oversight of Defence Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence
- iv. To ensure proper handling of highly classified material, the Members are subject to the Official Secrets Act.
- v. Members of the ISC are appointed by the Parliament from both the Houses – House of Commons and House of Lords
- vi. The nomination process involves the consultation of the Prime Minister with the opposition leader. Moreover there are other such procedural requirements to ensure selection on merit
- vii. The main functions, duties and powers of the ISC include:
 - a. To examine/oversee the expenditure, administration, policy and operations of the security community

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- b. To examine/oversee any other activities of the Government in intelligence and security matters
- c. To consider any operational matter (excluding any ongoing operation)
- d. To make annual reports to Parliament on its workings and findings and any other reports on any aspects of its functionality. However, the Prime Minister may exclude any content if the ISC also agrees that it would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the Agencies.
- e. It can direct the Services Chiefs/Heads of Intelligence Agencies to disclose information. However, to the Secretary of State (Minister of Defence) can veto such disclosure on the grounds of national security. Previously this veto power was enjoyed by the heads of intelligence agencies. However, in order to improve transparency and limit discretion, the bar has been raised.

Changing Face of National and International Security

In a world of startling change, the first duty of any government remains the security of the country. As globalization is enveloping the world, countries are exposed to new vulnerabilities. The programme provided a great opportunity to the delegation to discuss the newly emerging security challenges that countries are facing in the 21st century and the efforts of the governments to counter them. In a stark comparison with the past, the new challenges are mostly unforeseen threats to our security. For instance, one of the biggest challenges that the open societies are facing is cyber-terrorism.

Cyber Terrorism

The definition of Cyber-terrorism is controversial. However, it generally refers to launching internet attacks for large-scale disruption of computer networks generally through computer viruses. The primary objective is normally to create alarm and panic, and system failure.

Over the past few years a number of Pakistan Government's websites were hacked and even though Pakistan has not so far been affected by incidents of cyber terrorism, it is important that laws are formulated against cyber terrorism and effective institutes are identified and empowered to deal with such threats.

Moreover, cyber-terrorism is not the sole threat. Cyber-crimes are another challenge that need effective Government response. The complexity in cyber-terrorism/cyber-crimes is to identify the actor and to pin responsibility. It involves implication under International Law. As a hacker might use a fake IP address and launch an attack posing to be a national of Country A, whereas actually residing in Country B. Another associated challenge is to delineate Government's response against the cyber-weapons. The tough choices may range from launching diplomatic demarche to a kinetic military response against the attacker. Moreover, it is unclear as yet how to fix the state responsibility under such attacks.

The social media has been classified as an important tool at the hand of terrorists to promote their agendas. Terrorists also use it to promote radicalization and recruitment of new zealots in their ranks.

Home-Grown Radicalization in the UK

Another grave threat the open societies such as the UK are facing is 'Home grown radicalization'. Pakistan is also facing the brunt of this challenge.

Since 9/11 attacks in the United States, and U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the term has often been applied to violence that is perpetrated against people or property by their own citizens (or residents) to promote political, religious, or ideological objectives.

Domestic terrorists, fired by ideological and military zeal, have the ability to carry on their fight in a decentralized structure regardless of whether the source of inspiration is domestic, foreign, or transnational.

Home-grown or imported terrorism is not new to the United States or Europe. However, it has been successfully suppressed through effective use of domestic intelligence and law enforcement.

Pakistan has been similarly affected by home grown radicalized groups which are motivated by religious ideologies.

It is interesting to note that the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in the UK are proactively working, not only to monitor the internet traffic especially the social media, but also carrying out de-radicalization efforts to spot the

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potential recruits who are vulnerable to radicalization. After identifying such individuals, they are traced and are subjected to psychological screening followed by adequate efforts to address the vulnerabilities that could push them into the ranks of terrorist/criminal organizations. The success rate of such a drive has not been established as yet. But it is evident that these measures have proved to be quite effective in tackling radicalization.

International Intelligence Cooperation

International cooperation among national security and intelligence services represents one of most significant challenges to security sector accountability today.

The proliferation of transnational threats has necessitated increased international cooperation among intelligence and security agencies. Yet, information sharing and other forms of cooperation have significant implications for human rights and therefore demand robust external oversight of the public representatives.

Oversight and review bodies, however, face significant difficulties in holding intelligence and security services to account for their cooperation with foreign partners directly to Parliament.

Pakistan has been cooperating with US, China, Afghanistan in uprooting terrorist networks and to curb militancy in the region. However the parliament and the public have little or no knowledge or oversight of the military cooperation. The Parliamentary check is an important and effective tool to repose the trust of the public on the intelligence agencies and their operations and make the transnational intelligence sharing cooperation among different agencies, effective and transparent.

Role of Political Parties and Think Tanks in Influencing Policy-making/Makers

Think Tanks perform an important role in policy formulation. Most policy institutes are non-profit organizations, whereas some are funded by the government, advocacy groups, or businesses.

In Britain, Think Tanks enjoy prestige and status. Parliamentary leaders, seasoned bureaucrats, renowned academicians and experts provide vital inputs for the research work. This quality input enables the Think Tanks to produce qualitative research and furnish recommendations on any given topic which in turn shape any domestic/foreign policy.

Moreover, they also enjoy transnational cooperation. For example, the London-based think tank Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations were both conceived at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 and have remained sister organizations.

The Bow Group, founded in 1951, is the oldest centre-right think tank and many of its members have gone on to serve as Members of Parliament or Members of the European Parliament. Past Chairmen have included Conservative Party leader Michael Howard, Margaret Thatcher's longest-serving Cabinet Minister Geoffrey Howe, Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont and former British Telecom chairman Christopher Bland.

Pakistan lags behind in both quantitative and qualitative terms as far as Think Tanks and their research work is concerned. Our Think Tanks mainly revolve around internal politics, foreign security issues, and regional geo-politics. Most recently, institutes such as the National University of Science and Technology have embarked on creating industrial linkages to create think tanks focusing on industrial and economic growth issues.

Most are known to the general public through seminars and newspaper articles, or conducting workshops and lectures at colleges and universities.

If given proper attention, they can empower the members of the parliament to effectively address our domestic and international issues through enacting new legislation and pruning the existing one.

The political parties, irrespective of the fact whether they are on the Treasury benches or the Opposition benches, also share the responsibility by setting up precedents of respecting the Constitution and the law and by ensuring accountability for anyone who has violated the constitution or the law.

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Recommendations

On the basis of these discussions and workshops, a number of recommendations have been drawn to improve the parliamentary oversight on the national security strategy, accountability of defence spending and intelligence activities in Pakistan. These recommendations are detailed below.

The week-long programme provided an exhaustive detail of the functioning of the UK's Parliament and its oversight of the intelligence agencies, their budget and the cooperation and intelligence sharing with other countries.

It also provided a reference point to the delegation to evaluate the policies and practices of our successive governments on the issue of ensuring Parliamentary oversight over the security establishment, allocation and spending of defense budget and the steps being taken to ensure proper functioning of the security agencies as instruments of the State.

Pakistan can draw the following lessons:

- i. A similar committee, such as the ISC in UK, in our Parliament can be created through an Act.
- ii. Proper checks and balances can ensure effective handling of high-classified data.
- iii. Members can be selected through a similar procedure, i.e., through mutual consultation of Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition. However, our history shows that Parliamentarians find it challenging to arrive at a consensus on such nominations (selection of Chief Election Commissioner a case in point).
- iv. The classified information may only be shared with the permission of the Head of the Committee and the Prime Minister.
- v. The Defence Minister, in consultation with the Heads of the Armed Forces/Intelligence agencies, may Veto any content or any disclosure of document on grounds of national security but not limited to it.
- vi. A review of the Committee may be conducted after every two and a half years to evaluate its effectiveness and suggestions for improving its efficiency would be incorporated in the Act through amendments.
- vii. However, it would be futile to expect overnight results in a country like Pakistan through creation of such a Committee. Nonetheless, it would be a good starting point for the Parliamentarians, who have to prove their competence through their vision, knowledge, efforts and strength of personal character, to step up the role of the Parliament as a supervisory body of the security establishment in not only financial or budgetary issues but also operational matters.

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Analysis by Senator Mohsin Leghari

The primary lesson learnt during the visit was that extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures to deal with the circumstances. Our visit was at a time when the British society was faced with the growing menace of the ISIS sympathizers and British nationals are being recruited or are voluntarily going off to Iraq and Syria to actively participate in the war. Britain being the cradle of democracy and flag bearer of human rights and personal freedom, when challenged with the threat of homegrown terrorism, is considering extreme measures to counter this threat.

Legislation was under consideration on counter terrorism and security would go on to deprive citizens of their citizenship and render them stateless. When pointed out by our visiting delegation that such action might be against the basic civil rights and be counter productive, Rt. Hon. Keith Vaz, Chair, Home Affairs Select Committee, shared that terrorism was an issue that no party wanted to appear to have a soft stance on and with the elections on the horizon, the legislation was expected not to have much political resistance at its passage.

The meeting with David Anderson QC, Independent Reviewer of UK Anti-Terrorism Legislation, and the role of this office was something new for us. This non-governmental office has a very high degree of clearance to have access to secret and sensitive national security information. The Independent Reviewer has the unique role of being completely independent of government influence to inform the Parliament on anti terrorism legislation through regular reports. This results in political debate on anti terrorism laws in the United Kingdom.

Another learning experience was that the media and press are “advised” by the defence department on coverage of material that might be detrimental to “national interests.” DA-notices are issued by the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee (DPBAC) as warnings to media editors about military and intelligence information that it deems damaging to security. Though they are not binding, they but have generally been adhered to.

The exposure to the work of the select committees in the British parliamentary system was another learning experience. Comprising of the members of the Parliament from across the political parties, much like our standing committees, these committees look at the working of their respective departments and call them in for hearings and question the departments on their working, any existing or proposed policy. The select committee hearings seem open to public and are broadcast live.

The visit to London Borough of Waltham Forest and learning the role of the community engagement in implementation of a policy was another new learning experience.

The Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition's interaction during the Prime Minister's Questions was a new experience for the delegation, since the Prime Minister hardly ever does this in our parliament. Seeing the UK Prime Minister respond to questions on a wide range of subjects, was an interesting experience.

Our visit coincided with London conference on Afghanistan and the trilateral (UK Pak Afghan) talks. In our interactions at the British parliament, one had a distinct feeling that the Pakistan narrative had not been effectively conveyed to the British parliamentarians.

APPENDICES

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Appendix A

List and Profiles of Pakistan Delegation

(Note: Order of Delegates from 1-5 is in Alphabetical order by first Name)

No.	Name & Designation	Political Affiliation
1.	Senator Muhammad Mohsin Khan Leghari Member Senate Standing Committee on Defence	Independent - Punjab
2.	Mr. Omar Ayub Khan, MNA Chairman National Assembly Standing Committee on Finance, Revenue, Economic Affairs, Statistics & Privatization	Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) - KP
3.	Senator Nawabzada Saifullah Magsi Member Senate Standing Committees on Cabinet Secretariat, Water and Power, Law and Justice and Parliamentary Affairs	Pakistan Peoples Party – Parliamentarian (PPPP) - Balochistan
4.	Mr. Sufyan Yusuf, MNA Chairman, National Assembly Standing Committee on Communication	MuttahidaQuami Movement – (MQM) - Sindh
5.	Syeda Zahra Fatemi, MNA Member National Assembly's Standing Committees on Information Technology and Telecommunication; National Health Services, Regulations and Coordination	PML-N, Punjab
6.	Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob President PILDAT	NONE
7.	Ms. Aasiya Riaz Joint Director PILDAT	NONE

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Profiles



Senator Muhammad Mohsin Khan Leghari

Independent, Punjab

Member Senate Standing Committee on Defence

Senator Muhammad Mohsin Khan Leghari was born on June 9, 1963 at Dera Ghazi Khan. After initial schooling at Aitchison College Lahore, he studied engineering at the University of Oklahoma, USA. He obtained certification in Financial Markets from the Securities Institute of Australia and also has a Post Graduate Diploma in Applied Economics from the University of the Punjab, Lahore. He was elected as Senator for six year term in March 2012 from Punjab as an independent candidate. He is a member of the Senate Standing Committee on Defence. Before that he served as a Member of Provincial Assembly of the Punjab from 2008-2012. He also served as Chairman, Punjab Assembly Standing Committee on Local Government and Rural Development. Mr. Leghari is an avid reader and a keen weekend golfer.



Mr. Omar Ayub Khan, MNA

NA-19, Haripur, KP, PML-N

Chairman National Assembly Standing Committee on Finance, Revenue, Economic Affairs, Statistics and Privatization

Mr. Omar Ayub Khan completed his BBA in 1993 and MBA in 1996 from the George Washington University, Washington DC, U.S.A. He established his own polymer based industry in 1997 and served as Chief Executive Officer till 2002. He served as Chief Executive Officer of the Universal Insurance Company Ltd. from 1998 to 2002. He is a qualified Lead Auditor of the ISO 9001/2000 Quality Management System. He was elected as Member National Assembly from NA 19 (Haripur, NWFP) in 2002 and represented his constituency till 2007. He was appointed as Parliamentary Secretary for Finance in 2003 and as Minister of State for Finance in 2004. He served as a Governor, Asian Development Bank from 2004-2007. He was selected as a Young Global Leader from Pakistan by the World Economic Forum in 2007. Mr. Omar Ayub Khan also served as the State Minister of Finance in Mr. Shaukat Aziz's cabinet.

Mr. Omar Ayub Khan is currently affiliated with Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and was elected as the member of National Assembly of Pakistan in 2013 Elections. Mr. Khan is the Chairman National Assembly Standing Committee on Finance.

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Senator Nawabzada Saifullah Magsi

PPPP, Balochistan

Nawabzada Saifullah Magsi was born on November 17, 1981. He was elected to the Senate of Pakistan for a six-year term in March 2012. Senator Magsi is a Barrister-at-Law by profession having studied from Lincolns Inn (2004-2005), University College London (2000-2004), Wellington College, Crowthorne, Berkshire, UK (1998-2000) and the Aitchison College (1995-1998). He is politically affiliated with the Pakistan Peoples Party. He is a member of Senate Standing Committees including the Cabinet Secretariat, Water and Power, Law and Justice and Parliamentary Affairs. Mr. Magsi has held the portfolios of Provincial Minister for Planning and Development, Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Department of Prosecution and IPC from November 2007- April 2008.



Mr. Sufyan Yusuf, MNA

NA-247, Karachi-IX, Sindh, MQM

Chairman, National Assembly Standing Committee on Communication

Mr. Sufyan Yusuf was born on June 26, 1978 in Karachi. He received his M.Sc. degree in Civil Engineering from UK in 2006. He returned to the National Assembly of Pakistan for his second term in 2013 General Election. He is currently chairing the National Assembly Standing Committee on Communication. His areas of legislative interest include Foreign Affairs, Science & Technology and Communication. He enjoys reading and playing hockey.



Syeda Zahra Wadood Fatemi, MNA

NA-296-Women Punjab, XXIV, PML-N

Syeda Zahra Wadood Fatemi is a Member of National Assembly of Pakistan. She is a member of National Assembly's Standing Committees on Information Technology and Telecommunication and National Health Services, Regulations and Coordination. Ms. Fatemi holds a Bachelors degree in Arts from the University of Karachi and has around thirty-one years of administrative and managerial experience in coordination and event management at diplomatic level in various areas of the world. Ms. Zahra has remained a member of Committee of Common Wealth Women Association, China (May 1991-January 1993), President of All Diplomatic Women Association, Zimbabwe (February 1993 – Dec 1996), Founder and Chairperson of Asian Women Group, Zimbabwe, (January 1994-Dec 1996), President of Friends of Pakistan (FOP) & All Pakistan Women Association (APWA), U.S.A (September 1999 – August 2000). Apart from being gifted with excellent oratory and Interpersonal skills, Ms. Zahra Fatemi is a Chairperson of True Worth Foundation, an NGO working on poverty alleviation. She is also a Member of Board of IRADAH Foundation for handicapped children (Deaf & Dumb) District Chakwal, Punjab since 2010.

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Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob
President, PILDAT

The founder President of PILDAT, Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob has over 25 years experience in senior management and advisory positions and over 10 years experience in design, planning and implementation of projects in the field of Parliamentary development, strengthening democratic institutions, democratisation, political discourse, election monitoring and dialogues for reconciliation. Mr. Mehboob is considered an authority on political, legislative and electoral affairs of the country. Mr. Mehboob's focus has been on strengthening democracy and democratic institutions and providing thought leadership on crucial issues that affect democracy and political growth in the country. Mr. Mehboob has carved and spearheaded a non-partisan political research initiative from the platform of PILDAT and has facilitated the formation of Dialogue, Research and Policy Groups on areas such as Civil-Military Relations, Centre-Province Relations, Relations between the Muslim World and the West and Electoral Reforms, etc. Of special significance has been PILDAT's initiative of Dialogue process on Civil-Military Relations. Working to establish a constitutional equation of civil-military relations in Pakistan is a first initiative of its kind in Pakistan by PILDAT and remains one of its continuing areas of focus over the years. Mr. Mehboob has authored and edited more than 100 Briefing Papers, Background Papers and Case Studies relating to Parliamentary Budget Process, Parliamentary Committees, Legislative Strengthening, Electoral Systems, Parliamentary Strengthening and Democracy Watch programmes, etc. Mr. Mehboob is regularly invited by national and international media for analysis and commentaries in addition to national and international conferences.

Mr. Mehboob holds a B.Sc. degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Engineering & Technology Lahore, Pakistan. As an engineer, he has served outside Pakistan in the Middle East and USA. As a student activist, Mr. Mehboob was elected as President, Engineering University Students Union from 1971-1972 and also served as Chairman, Lahore Students Council in 1972. Mr. Mehboob was born on October 28, 1952.



Ms. Aasiya Riaz
Joint Director, PILDAT

Ms. Aasiya Riaz, Joint Director of PILDAT, coordinates various research projects within PILDAT and manages PILDAT's projects and activities as PILDAT's co-director. She has over 10 years' experience of working in the field of research, management and analysis. She has been working in the areas of democratic and legislative strengthening; research on political and public policy issues; civil-military relations; dialogues between the Muslim World and the West and Electoral Process, etc.

Trained in the field of media and political communication at the London School of Economics, UK, Aasiya has worked with the mainstream press and electronic media in Pakistan as well. She was also a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy, USA where she worked on US Think Tanks and the subject of Civil-Military Relations. Aasiya also graduated from the Stanford University, USA Course on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law in August 2007. She regularly appears on national and international media for political analysis and commentaries.



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