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More
of the Same: Revival of Military Courts
A view of the Parliamentary Leaders addressing a Press Conference
after a meeting in the Speaker of National Assembly’s Chamber on February
28, 2017 to forge consensus on revival of Military Courts
What had been dreaded has transpired; the elected
Government, with the expiry of the sunset clause of the 21st Constitutional
Amendment on January 07, 2017, has sought an extension in the term of the Military
Courts for another two years. Major political parties have thrown their weight
behind the proposal as well, including the JUI-F and the JI with the Pakistan
Peoples Party, however, still hesitant on the matter.
The formation of the Military Courts came about
as an ‘extraordinary measure’ in the aftermath of the APS tragedy
of December 16, 2014; packaged by Government as a somewhat bitter pill that
had to be swallowed for a short while not only as a way to eradicate terrorism
but as a stop-gap arrangement due to inefficiencies of the legal system, hence
the two-year sunset clause allowing the Government and Parliament to bring in
necessary reforms to strengthen the legal system to adequately and effectively
manage challenges of terrorism. Reforms in the criminal justice system within
two years were also a central tenet of the National Action Plan (NAP). However,
without any progress on reforming the judicial system, the proposal to re-establish
military courts is tantamount to Government failure.
This highly contentious creation of a parallel
system of justice was passed in the shape of 21st Constitutional Amendment by
the current Parliament in January 2015. However, the Parliament, for its part,
has also done precious little in the past two years on reviewing the performance
of the Government on reforms in Pakistan’s criminal justice system. Although
the Senate did a commendable job to produce a detailed report on the Provision
of Inexpensive and Speedy Justice in the Country after detailed deliberations
in its Committee of the Whole in December 2015, the Parliament on the whole
did not exercise its oversight role in a befitting manner. Its Committees should
have sought monthly reports from the Government on the steps taken to reform
the justice system. Had the Parliament done its duty at that time, it would
not be discussing again today whether or not to give two more years to the Government
for the same purpose.
Due to the failure of both the Government and
the Parliament, it is indeed disappointing that we find ourselves at the same
cross roads again, with the same arguments being floated.
To add to the frustration, there are no real
statistics or communication by the Government on the utility that Military Courts
have extended in the fight against terrorism. This much is known that during
their tenure, military courts tried 274 cases of terrorism and sentenced 161
terrorists to death, whereas another 116 were given varying jail terms, mostly
life sentences. Out of the 161 sentenced to death, 12 have been executed till
now.
According to the numbers calculated by PILDAT
based on media reports which may or may not be completely accurate, convictions
of around 35 militants are pending before the Peshawar High Court.1 In addition, review petitions of at least 11 of the convicts of military
courts against dismissal of their earlier appeals are also pending before the
Supreme Court. Given that the Supreme Court and High Courts have carried out
in-camera proceedings in this regard, it is difficult to verify the ground for
the appeals.
PILDAT reiterates that the following points
must be taken into consideration before making any hasty decision on the matter:
- The matter must be strictly resolved within the Parliament
and through its Committees, through detailed briefings by the Prime Minister
Office, Ministry of Defence and Interior, and senior Military Officials,
and not as has been done till now through Multi Party Conferences, or hasty
meetings of Parliamentary leaders within the Speakers’ Chambers.
- Given that terrorism still haunts Pakistan, even after
the two-year expiry of the Military Courts, reasons may be made clear why
the extraordinary measure achieved only partial success.
- Given its inability in instituting reforms in the criminal
justice system in the past two years, the Government may outline any proposals
it has in this regard with concrete timeline, along with also stating why
it was unable to bring these reforms in the first place during the past
two years.
- Unlike in the past, the Parliament must also redeem itself
and carry out an effective and regular oversight in this regard. Monitoring
progress on criminal justice reforms should be the responsibility of the
Parliamentary Committees on Law and Justice, and monitoring implementation
of the National Action Plan should be that of the Parliamentary Committees
on Interior. The most effective way to do so may be to combine the mental
and financial resources through combining the Standing Committees of the
Senate and the National Assembly for this purpose.
Operation
Radd-ul-Fassad
The launch of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad
on February 22, 2017 comes at the heels of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched during
the tenure of former COAS, Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif on June 15, 2014, which
had the main aim of neutralizing the former militant stronghold of North Waziristan.
Although the launching of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad
might have been in the offing for some time, its apparent catalyst was a series
of terrorist attacks that rocked all four provinces of Pakistan during the first
two weeks of February 2017, culminating in the attack on the popular shrine
of Shahbaz Qalandar at Sehwan on February 16, 2017.
Essentially, the objectives of the Operation
can be delineated as:2
- Eliminating any remaining and latent threats of terrorism
- Consolidating gains of previous operations
- Countrywide de-weaponization and explosive control
- Conduct of ‘Broad Spectrum Security’ by the
Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) in the province
- Greater border security management
Unlike Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which
was only restricted to North Waziristan, the theater of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad
will be the whole country.
Importantly, Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) have
also been deployed for the Operation in the province, although a decision had
already been taken in this regard in a meeting of the Apex Committee of the
Punjab on February 19, 20173. The suicide attack on Lahore’s Charing Cross on February 13, 2017
forms a crucial link to the deployment of Rangers in the province. Rangers have
been given policing powers under the Anti Terrorism Act of 1997, which was announced
in a notification issued by the Federal Ministry of Interior the same day Operation
Radd-ul-Fassad was announced.4
It is important to note that the deployment
of Rangers in a province had been construed to be an irritant for civil-military
relations in Pakistan by various observers. Regardless of whether there was
any truth to this or not, opposition parties such as the PPP and PTI on numerous
occasions have publically demanded deployment of Rangers in the province.
PILDAT believes that the following points need
to considered in this regard:
- Many procedural and constitutional precursors to the launch
of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad remain opaque. For instance, the ISPR
press release, which announced the launch of the Operation, does not make
it clear at what forum the decision to launch the Operation was made. The
Federal Cabinet’s last meeting was held on February 07, 2017, and
launching an operation across the country certainly did not figure on its
33-point agenda.5 Neither was a meeting of the National Security Committee, the country’s
‘principal decision-making body on matters of national security’
convened. Maybe the decision was taken at one of the security huddles convened
at the Prime Minister Office, which see inclusion of select members of the
Cabinet and military leadership with the notable but ironic exclusion of
the Federal Minister of Defence,.
- Notably, the announcement of the Operation came from the
ISPR, which usually assumes responsibility for issuing press releases on
security related measures, including launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb,
formation of Military Courts, formation of Provincial Apex Committees, etc.
In addition, it was only when Pakistani media persons accompanying the Premier
asked questions about the operation during his visit to Turkey that he clarified
that the decision to launch the operation had been taken at a meeting held
at Prime Minister House some days earlier. This creates the impression of
a dearth of ownership on part of the civilian elected Government for such
security related measures.
- This lack of ownership is also reflected on the part of
the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures in their responsibilities to
ask the right questions on targets and timelines of the operation as well
as carrying out their due oversight role. For example, the Parliamentary
Committees on Defence and Interior have hardly made any systematic effort
with regards to developing oversight on progress of implementation of National
Action Plan since it was formed.
- Lastly, questions also remain with regards to successful
implementation of the National Action Plan, and how shared responsibility
of the civil-military in relation to it will contribute to the success of
the Operation. Currently, as per PILDAT’s research, oversight on implementation
of NAP within the Government is being carried out by the Implementation
and Review Committee under the leadership of the National Security Advisor,
while data in relation to it is still being collated by NACTA. Resultantly,
an impression is perpetuated that implementation and oversight of NAP is
currently being done through ad-hoc measures, with no clear institutionalized
mechanism in place.
- Although de-weaponization, explosive control, better border
security management, counter-terrorism operations by Rangers in Punjab,
are mentioned as some of the key features of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad,
the eventual aims remain unclear. Without this clarity, Pakistan may seem
destined to lurch from one military operation to the other without measuring
the success of any of these.
Gen.
(Retd.) Raheel Sharif to lead Saudi-led Military Alliance?
After his retirement, Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif,
former COAS, is in the news again amid rumours that he has accepted the proposition
to lead the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT).6
Although rumours were doing rounds in this regard
since December 2016, the Federal Minister of Pakistan, Khawaja Muhammad Asif,
MNA provided credence to these. While appearing on a talk show of Geo Television
called Naya Pakistan on January 06, 2017, he claimed that ‘the
agreement in this regard had been finalized a few days ago’. He went
on to claim that ‘as you are aware that this thing was in the pipeline
for quite some time and the Prime Minister was also part of the deliberations
… definitely our Government's consent must have been part of this’.7
Pakistan had initially found itself in the crosshairs
of Middle Eastern politics as Saudi Arabia named it as part of its newly formed
military alliance of Muslim countries meant to combat terrorism, apparently
without first getting Pakistan’s consent. However, after initial ambiguity,
the Government had confirmed its participation in the alliance, but had said
that the scope of its participation would be defined after the Kingdom shared
the details of the coalition it was assembling.
As media commentaries gained speed, criticizing
the former COAS for becoming a part of an Alliance that may not have unanimous
support of all the Muslim countries, especially Iran, and the precarious position
this would place Pakistan in, the elected Government seemed to retract the publically
stated position. For example, only two days later on January 08, 2017, the Prime
Minister’s spokesperson, Mr. Mussadiq Malik, stated that no official proposal
had been shared with the elected Government in this regard.
In addition, in what can only be termed a complete
volte-face, while appearing before the Pakistan Senate on January 10, 2017,
the Federal Minister for Defence stated that the Federal Government was as of
yet unaware of any development regarding Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif's appointment
as head of the coalition. He also said it was mandatory for him, as is for every
other retired army officer, to seek an NOC from the Defence Ministry before
embarking on any new assignment abroad, but a No Objection Certificate had not
been sought in this regard.8
Given that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has made
no official communication in this regard, PILDAT regrets the casual and allusive
attitude of the Defence Minister during his talk show appearance on January
06, 2017. Given that he holds such an important portfolio, he not only should
have been better informed about the development, but may have also exercised
caution while commenting on it.
Land
Allotted to Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif
The former COAS was in the news again when a
news story claimed that‘Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif has been allotted
868 kanals and 10 marlas of land (about 90 acres) on Bedian Road Lahore, and
not just 482 kanals, through the Border Area Committee’.9 The News’ report went on to put an estimate of the land at around
Pakistani Rs. 1.35 billion, which may appreciate to Pak Rs. 4 billion in a few
years’ time.
This story set ablaze the national media, with
the move hyped as an exclusive privilege extended to the former COAS. The controversy
gained further ground when the ISPR issued a Press Release on January 26, 2017
stating that ‘Issue of allotment of land to Army Officers and Jawans
is being debated and conjectured for last few days. It may be noted that such
allotments are made through constitutional provision. Allotment to former COAS
Gen. Raheel Sharif is also under same provision and through Government/Army
procedures. This debate of maligning army also has the potential to create misunderstandings
between state institutions thus considered detrimental to existing cohesion’.10
While it is unclear which ‘constitutional
provisions’ the ISPR referred to, it goes without saying that the nation
owes a lot to the members of the Armed Forces, both those martyred and retired,
and arrangements should be made for them, or their families to lead comfortable
lives, in case of martyrdom or post retirement. In addition, both Gen. (Retd.)
Raheel Sharif and the institution he has led are held in high public regard.
While PILDAT can recognise the necessity on
the part of the ISPR to set the record straight on the matter and hence issue
a Press Release, the strong wording of the presser not only further instigated
the controversy but its final sentence alluded to misunderstanding between the
State institutions, which is vague and probably unwarranted.
PILDAT believes that for a variety of compelling
reasons, including the need to keep such matters above board, there remains
a crucial need for absolute constitutional, legal and procedural transparency
in such matters of land allocation and other privileges. The current system
of land allocation is shrouded in a cloak of opacity and will remain a source
of contention and controversy, alongside rumours, unless greater transparency
is instituted. There is also a need to consider another system of reward for
our Army officials, both retired and martyred since land is a finite resource.
Given there has already been criticism of the institution for its alleged real
estate interests, both the Government and the Military require to consider other
workable alternatives. While there have been proposals initiated in Pakistan
Senate for re-examination of post retirement benefits, 11 this may be taken up in a bipartisan manner where views of the Pakistan
Military may also be incorporated.
No
Meeting of the National Security Committee
One had hoped for a changed attitude on part
of the Government, especially with a new COAS leading Pakistan Army, regarding
institutionalized consultation at the level of the National Security Committee
which the Government has formed and itself termed it as the country’s
‘principal decision-making body on matters of national security’.
Unfortunately, effective utilization of the
forum continues to be elusive, with the latest meeting of the NSC taking place
on April 05, 2016, nearly 11 months ago. It must be mentioned here that since
its formation in August 2013, the NSC has only met for a total of 5 times, denoting
the lack of seriousness regarding an institution created by the current Government
itself. It is important to note that similar consultative forums in developed
democracies such as the UK, meet once every week. That is how national security
management is institutionalized, and its democratic oversight is ensured.
While the NSC is formed by the PML-N Government
since August 2013, instead of holding and chairing NSC meetings and using the
form created for the purpose to hold crucial consultations, the Prime Minister
appears to prefer meeting the COAS in one-on-one meetings or in the company
of his handpicked Ministers to deliberate on important national security issues.
Just during January and February 2017 when the country was once again rocked
by major terrorism incidents and a key decision to launch yet another military
operation has been taken, Prime Minister chose to do so by chairing three meetings
on security matters at the PMO with his choice of military leadership and members
of the Cabinet instead of a meeting of the NSC.
Ideally, the decision to launch Operation Radd-ul-Fassad
should have been taken in a meeting of the NSC and the Cabinet. However, no
one knows when the decision in this regard was taken, what were the considerations
that went into it, whether there is any official record of the Government holding
any consultations on the matter, etc. Important questions such as what are the
targets set for the operation, what is the timeline of the operation and how
the Government will monitor its implementation are also unknown. The nation
is still unaware of the agreed timeline, targets set and achieved and nature
of success or failure of the earlier operation Zarb-e-Azb. Arguably
the NSC is the principle forum where such an progress on implementation against
targets can be gauged. With the continued dormancy of NSC, one gets little comfort
in the civilian democratic institutions’ capacity and will to effectively
oversee and manage national security issues of such proportion.
Premier-COAS
Interactions
Meeting held at the Prime Minister House on February 15,
2017
In the months of January and February 2017,
the Prime Minister and the COAS met for a total of 3 times:
- The first meeting was held on January 03, 2017 at the Prime
Minister House and was also attended by the Prime Minister’s Advisor
on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sartaj Aziz; Federal Minister for Interior, Chaudhry
Nisar Ali Khan, MNA; Federal Minister for Finance, Senator Ishaq Dar; National
Security Adviser, Lt. Gen. (Retd) Nasser Khan Janjua, and the DG ISI, Lt.
Gen. Naveed Mukhtar.
- The second meeting was held on January 10, 2017 at the
Prime Minister House to signal the Federal Government’s intent to
revive the Military Courts. It was also attended by Federal Minister for
Finance, Senator Ishaq Dar; Federal Minister for Interior, Chaudhry Nisar
Ali Khan, MNA; Prime Minister’s Advisor on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sartaj
Aziz; Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tariq
Fatemi; National Security Advisor, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Nasser Khan Janjua;
DG ISI Lt. Gen. Naveed Mukhtar and Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister,
Mr. Fawad Hassan Fawad.
- The third meeting was held on February 15, 2017, again
at the Prime Minister House and was attended by the Federal Minister for
Finance, Senator Ishaq Dar; Federal Minister for Interior, Chaudhry Nisar
Ali Khan, MNA; Prime Minister’s Advisor on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sartaj
Aziz; Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tariq
Fatemi; National Security Advisor, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Nasser Khan Janjua;
the Chief of General Staff, Lt. Gen. Bilal Akbar, National Coordinator NACTA,
Mr. Ihsan Ghani and DG Intelligence Bureau, Mr. Aftab Sultan.
In all three meetings, the Federal Minister
for Defence was absent.
References
2. As for the targets of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad,
a Press Release issued by the ISPR on February 22, 2017 stated that ‘Operation
aims at indiscriminately eliminating residual/latent threat of terrorism,
consolidating gains of operations made thus far and further ensuring security
of the borders… Countrywide de-weaponization and explosive control
are additional cardinals of the effort. Pursuance of National Action Plan
will be the hallmark of this operation’
The complete text of the Press Release may be accessed at:
https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&cat=army&date=2017/2/22
6. The Islamic Military Alliance (IMA),
officially Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) alternative
translation Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, is an intergovernmental
counter-terrorist alliance of multiple Muslim majority countries,
totaling around 40, united around military intervention against ISIL and
other counter-terrorist activities. Its creation was first announced
by Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud, Saudi Arabia's Minister of Defense,
on December 15, 2015.
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